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INTRODUCTION
TONI M. MASSARO*
At first glance, William and Mary Law School does not seem
an ideal setting for a gender journal. Unlike Berkeley, Rutgers,
Columbia, and UCLA-to name a few other schools with women's
law reviews-William and Mary is a small southern school in a
pastoral setting. The campus and community are quaintly and
famously colonial, steeped in American history and charmingly
atavistic. Students and faculty drawn to this environment are,
one must assume, past-oriented enough to enjoy (or at least not
be startled by) grocery shopping among adults dressed in full
colonial costume. A place best known for such an elaborate re-
creation of an era of American history in which women were not
permitted to serve as jurors,'I could not become lawyers, could
not teach law, and were not allowed to vote may seem better
suited to a journal on American legal history than to one on
women and the law.
Yet when one reflects further on the location and this topic,
one realizes that there is no better place than the nation's oldest
law school to launch such a journal. What could be a more
impressive sign that gender issues now are widely understood
to be fundamental, important, and abiding concerns? And if, as
* Professor of Law, University of Arizona. B.S. 1977, Northwestern University; J.D.
1980, College of William & Mary.
1. See Barbara Allen Babcock, A Place in the Palladium: Women's Rights and Jury
Service, 61 U. CI. L. REV. 1139 (1993).
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many theorists argue, gender is a social construct, then what
better place to remind us of the domestic history that informed
its contemporary meaning? A walk down the Duke of Gloucester
Street in the midst of writing or editing an article on women
and property might cast a powerful, unique light on the subject.
Likewise, the changing attitudes about the economic rights and
political rights of women take on special significance in a setting
that reenacts the stark historical division of labor along gender
lines.
So it is with a sense of site-significance that I introduce this
inaugural issue of the William & Mary Journal of Women and
the Law. It also gives me great personal pleasure to usher in the
next historical phase of women's achievement here.
When I graduated from William and Mary in May of 1980, Tim
Sullivan, who was then associate dean and is now president of
the college, commented on the powerful, evocative sense of place
and purpose that this school instills in its graduates. "You will
miss it," he said, and I have missed it.
But not all parts of the law school memories are as sweet as
others. The advent of this new journal effaces some of the less
sweet ones, even as it evokes some of the best.
When my class arrived on campus in 1977, the law school was
housed in the old facility, behind the Wren Building. The student
body and faculty were smaller, the faculty was less diverse, and
the library was, well, modest. The curriculum of 1977 made the
term "core" painfully apt, pared back as it was to doctrinal
basics. The faculty then included only one woman, Professor
Ingrid Hillinger, who single-handedly (though marvelously and
generously) carried the full weight of students' female "role
model" expectations.
Yet despite these limitations-or was it because of them?-a
counterpulse beat in the school that helped to make the law
school's subsequent dazzling changes possible, including the
changes represented by this new journal.
Thus I am happy to refute, at least in part, the claim of the
writer who recently observed that "[plredictably, perhaps, there
are no courses on feminist law or related topics at more tradi-
tionally conservative places, such as William and Mary, Washing-
ton and Lee, or Catholic University."2 His appraisal of the interest
2. Kenneth Lasson, Feminism Awry: Ezeesses in the Pursuit of Rights and Trfles,
42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 4 n.14 (1992).
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in feminist law at William and Mary-past and present-is quite
misleading.
For there clearly were, at least by the 1970s and likely well
before, people in the law school community who struggled to
raise gender issues in that unlikely setting. There were also
courses on gender issues at William and Mary; in the spring of
1980 newly hired Professor Lynda Butler introduced a seminar
on women and the law. More critically, however, the birth of
this journal clearly belies the writer's implication that at "tra-
ditionally conservative" places like William and Mary no one
regards curricular inattention to gender and the law as worri-
some. On the contrary, such silences may be felt most acutely
by students in such settings. Many of my classmates-more than
forty percent of whom were female-surely felt it more than
fifteen years ago, and were gratified when Professor Butler's
seminar debuted in 1980.
Even before that addition, however, there were signs of the
emerging importance of women's issues at the school. A little
known fact is that the editor-in-chief of the first issue of the
William and Mary Law Review, published in 1957, was a woman.
Moreover, the law school organization for women and the law, the
Mary and William Society, was in the late '70s a vibrant, uncom-
monly active group that organized and presented annual work-
shops on women's issues, which were attended by lawyers from
across the state. One of the early keynote speakers was Wendy
Williams, a pioneer in feminist jurisprudence. Her lecture on how
social structures often are fashioned without regard for women's
interests -comparing these structures to small door frames in
an African community where her (tall) sister was a Peace Corps
worker-hit home for many of us who were then learning law
surrounded by a framed legal history-texts, pictures, and vo-
cabulary from which women were entirely absent or seemed to
fit awkwardly, at best.
This journal honors these grassroots efforts, for it is, in part,
a product of this history of informal collaboration and defiance
of the legal conventions that rendered women and gender invis-
ible. Clearly, however, this formal voice will be a much stronger,
more certain means of assuring that gender issues will always
be raised and given their proper respect. Thus, although this
journal is part of a long, informal tradition at William and Mary,
it will recast, expand, and formalize that tradition. This is a
happy, auspicious development: William and Mary, where so much
history is enshrined, now officially recognizes the importance of
gender to legal and social institutions.
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The students who conceived of the journal and then applied
the time and energy necessary to make it happen deserve warm
thanks and praise. Law school is a busy three years, in which
most students' lives are consumed by the effort to master the
material, complete the steady stream of assignments, and land a
job. Creating a new journal, which is essentially like starting a
small business, is a massive undertaking that is likely to benefit
most the students who follow this first board of editors, some of
whom will have graduated by the time the first volume is com-
pleted. These students' gift to the law school and to future
students is considerable.
Yet surely some observers, including some alumnae and alumni,
will raise questions about the students' timing and their focus.
Some may think that this journal comes too late, and that its
appearance is not a sign of progress, but is simply evidence that
time again has stopped in Williamsburg. After all, isn't this a
post-feminist moment?
Others may share the lament of many modern academics that
American education generally3 and American legal education in
particular 4 have placed undue emphasis on divisive particularisms
of questionable salience, such as gender, race, and ethnicity.
Gender-consciousness, they may argue, has proven to be an
unproductive distraction within legal scholarship insofar as gen-
der does not make a stable or generalizable difference in legal
or social arrangements. As such, a journal devoted to the isolated
concern of "women and the law" is a venture that should be
denounced, not celebrated.
These criticisms are hardly weightless and deserve the close
attention they already have received elsewhere. I will not repro-
duce here these thoughtful exchanges; instead, I will simply
highlight some of the more persuasive responses to the critics
of gender scholarship in an effort to show how vital and unre-
solved the gender conflicts remain.
A first response is that some critics of gender scholarship may
misperceive the intellectual enterprise itself. "Women and the
Law" is a question, not an explanation. It does not entail any
one, temporally bound prescription, as even a cursory review of
feminist jurisprudence reveals. Consequently, the enterprise has
3. See, e.g., DINESH D'SouZA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION (1991); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER,
JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA (1992).
4. See, e.g., Lasson, supra note 2; Paul D. Carrington, Diversity!, 1992 UTAH L. REV.
1105.
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grown increasingly complex in recent decades. Gender scholarship
today is marked by an emphasis on context and continuums, and
a de-emphasis on fixed borders, grand theories, or categories.
Many modern gender theorists view gender as constructed and
not as a stable, acultural phenomenon.6 Indeed, some even ques-
tion the baseline assumption that at least the biological differ-
ences between men and women are fixed and enjoy culturally or
historically stable meanings.8
Attempts to capture these complexities have led gender schol-
arship, like many other strands of modern legal scholarship, to
become increasingly interdisciplinary and, in some respects, less
accessible to nonspecialists than it was in its infancy. Understand-
ing the cultural and myriad other dimensions of gender that bear
on legal problems now means consulting both traditional legal
materials and less familiar nonlegal materials. Correlatively, pre-
senting the relevant recent work on any specific topic within the
realm of women and the law today is more complicated than
simply publishing articles that synthesize and critique the re-
ported cases and statutes that touch on that topic. Specialty
journals like this one can best perform the task of bringing the
widening range of materials deemed relevant to law to the
attention of practitioners, scholars, judges, and students. Such
journals also can facilitate the necessary cross-fertilization of
disciplines that can yield new insights into law and its societal
implications.
Obviously, however, these complexities of gender lead to an-
other, quite basic dilemma for gender scholars. In light of the
diversity of women's lives, it sometimes seems useless or woefully
inadequate to focus on gender-in daily personal and political
encounters as well as in scholarship. Exacerbating these practical
difficulties is the fact that modern theoretical understandings of
gender are so fluid, even baffling. This has led some theorists to
speculate that gender's meaning may be so contextual, and its
borders so permeable, that "gender" studies-and, by implication,
a journal devoted to women and the law-may be hopelessly
shapeless endeavors.7 Gender, they fear, cannot stand as a mean-
ingful division within legal or other scholarship.
5. See, e.g., Monique Wittig, One is Not Born a Woman, FEMINIST ISSUES, Winter
1981, at 47; DIANA Fuss, ESSENTIALLY SPEAKING: FEMINISM, NATURE & DIFFERENCE (1989)
(discussing the potential incompatibility of feminism and deconstruction).
6. See, e.g., THOMAS LAQUEUR, MAKING SEX: BODY AND GENDER FROM THE GREEKS TO
FREUD (1990).
7. See FUSS, supra note 5, at 24.
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This more challenging question of nature versus construct
greatly complicates the feminist endeavor, but does not doom it.
It presents a paradox for feminist scholars, to be sure-one they
have already recognized., But so do many other central concepts
within legal practice and theory, as they too are mediated by
many factors that limit the stability and usefulness of categories
that nevertheless are commonly deployed within legal scholar-
ship.9 The theoretical challenge is to foster an appreciation for
this diversity without losing sight of the ways in which even
permeable borders are often useful ways of organizing intellectual
inquiries.
Many feminist scholars have responded to this challenge by
addressing the nature versus construct dilemma while still main-
taining their commitment to the significance of the gender marker.
In particular, they have focused considerable scholarly energy on
the following issue: what difference does gender necessarily (or
essentially) make? Is there something essentially male or female?
Do women necessarily solve problems differently from men? Are
they inevitably more aware of interdependence and connection?
Are men naturally inclined to think in linear and hierarchical
terms?
Or is gender entirely socially constructed- such that there is
no essential female or male voice, though women and men may
be placed by their social environment into particular, gender-
specific roles?
Much hinges on our responses to these theoretical questions.
In law the difference, if any, that gender necessarily makes is
8. Deborah Rhode has explained the gender paradox as follows:
Feminism's authority rests on its claims to speak from women's experience.
That very experience, however, demands attention to the diversity in wom-
en's circumstances.... [G]ender is always mediated by other forces that
structure identity, such as race, ethnicity, class, and sexual orientation.
Recognition of this diversity complicates the search for theoretical coherence
and political cohesion.
Deborah Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1181, 1182 (1994).
9. Examples of fundamental legal categories that lawyers and judges deploy despite
their contested borders include the following: speech versus conduct; omissions versus
commissions; crimes versus torts; and the publiclprivate distinction. Race and ethnicity,
like gender, are human characteristics that continue to define legal rights despite their
context-dependent salience and internal diversity. Law courses and texts are labelled
"civil rights law" though their content may vary significantly across instructors and
authors. Legal conferences, professional organizations, and legal journals are organized
around such capacious and fuzzily defined themes as "law and society" or "law and
economics." All of these legal categories remain useful markers, even though their borders
may dissolve in some contexts and reappear in others.
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especially relevant in discussions about equality. If women and
men are essentially different, then equal treatment may not be
a sensible or fair strategy. Treating women the same as men, which
is often the reference point law uses to determine equal treat-
ment, may mean treating them less well, if it ignores the ways
in which women differ from men. Women consistently will fail to
fit the male model-whether because many women solve prob-
lems differently from men, or because some women but no men
can bear children, or otherwise. As such, we may need to change
the workplace, the schoolroom, and other settings in a way that
considers these gender differences.
But if the sexes are not necessarily different- rather, we
merely have been treated as different in ways that historically
have banished many women to lower paying jobs and constraining
social scripts - then equal treatment is a sensible goal. Modifi-
cations will be needed in the transition, to ease the passage from
gender discrimination and gender-consciousness to a world in
which gender is not salient, not determinative, and not a life
sentence to a particular caste, line of work, or social "function.o
But equal treatment is the aim, according to this view.
All of this is a well-rehearsed theme in feminist scholarship,
presented here in an oversimplified form. Despite the attention
it has received, however, the issue is far from resolved. We have
not yet reached a cultural consensus about the difference that
gender does or should make in our lives. Consequently, far from
signalling the modern irrelevance of gender scholarship, the par-
adox of gender-consciousness raises a matter of central concern
within that scholarship. Its complexities are fundamental to an
inquiry that entails extremely basic questions about human iden-
tity and equality. This issue therefore does deserve separate
attention, even while its borders are under intellectual assault.
Indeed, the conflicts waged over the gender borders actually are
a sign of the issue's vitality and importance, not a sign of its
moribundity. Those who argue that the profession already has
gotten the gender insight and is ready to move on to other
insights underestimate these complexities, and may regard the
popularity and accessibility of a field as the sole measures of its
cultural significance. Clearly, however, these are not even valid
measures, let alone the sole ones for gauging the value of schol-
arly inquiries.
10. For a fuller discussion of the essentialism debate and its legal implications see
DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER (1989).
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Indeed, proof of the continued significance of inquiries into the
difference gender should or does make is evident even in such
thoroughly mainstream sources as the recent opinions of the
United States Supreme Court. Just last term, the Court reaf-
firmed the principle first advanced in Reed v. Reed" that classi-
fications based on gender trigger elevated scrutiny under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 12 Yet unlike race-based classifications,
which trigger strict scrutiny because they are presumptively
irrational,13 gender-based classifications trigger intermediate scru-
tiny and are lawful when they serve important government
interests.14 This constitutional doctrine suggests that in an ideal
legal order, race would be irrelevant; hence, race-based classifi-
cations are strongly disfavored. Yet even in an ideal world, the
doctrine implies, gender will continue to be relevant in at least
some situations. Again, the confoundingly difficult and unan-
swered question is this: when is a gender-based classification
benign and sensible? The Court's ambiguous, context-dependent
response to this question is a frank admission of its complexity,
and of the Court's present inability to resolve it.
The works that appear in this and future issues of the William
& Mary Journal of Women and the Law may assist the Court
and other legal decisionmakers, theorists, and practitioners in
responding to this complex and fundamental question. Articles
on the gender implications of domestic violence, workplace equity,
family leave policies, sexual harassment, and welfare laws are
examples of the kind of scholarship this forum will feature.
Likewise within its scope will be articles on the biological/socio-
logical construction of sexual identities, reproductive technolo-
gies, the public/private dichotomy, and theories of moral reasoning.
Works that address the gender implications of capitalism, liber-
alism, and socialism too may find a home here, as may studies
of the economic consequences of various workplace and domestic
structures. The problem of a modern journal with a focus on
gender therefore lies not in finding articles and issues adequate
to fill its pages, but in finding enough pages to encompass the
many aspects of this ever-timely, engrossing topic.
I urge scholars nationwide and beyond the United States to
support this new entry into the field by submitting manuscripts
11. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
12. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex re. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994) (holding that it is unconsti-
tutional for state actors to use gender as a basis for peremptory strikes in jury selection).
13. See, e.g., J.A. Croson Co. v. Richmond, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
14. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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and by subscribing, citing, and referring to this and future issues.
The William & Mary Journal of Women and the Law, like the
law school itself, is dedicated to transforming law to better serve
the needs of all members of contemporary society, even as it
hopes to preserve the best features of a proud national and local
history. The Journal's ultimate success, however, will depend on
the interest and active engagement of its readership, which the
editors hope will be large, critical, and committed to raising,
resolving, and reformulating the fundamental questions that the
gender inquiry entails. Our support is the very best way to
convey our thanks, and to honor the achievements of the women
of William and Mary-past, present, and future.
